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 ABSTRACT 
The Effect of Multinationality on Management Earnings Forecasts. (May 2005) 
 
Bruce Wayne Runyan, B. S.; B.S., University of Arkansas at Monticello; 
 
M.B.A., University of North Texas 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. L. Murphy Smith 
 
 
 
 This study examines the relationship between a firm’s degree of multinationality 
and its managers’ earnings forecasts. Firms with a high degree of multinationality are 
subject to greater uncertainty regarding earnings forecasts due to the additional risk 
resulting from the more complex multinational environment. Prior research demonstrates 
that firms that fail to meet or beat market expectations experience disproportionate 
market losses at earnings announcement dates. The complexities and greater uncertainty 
resulting from higher levels of multinationality are expected to be negatively associated 
with management earnings forecast precision, accuracy, and bias (downward versus 
upward).  
Results of the study are mixed. Regarding forecast precision, two measures of 
multinationality (foreign sales / total sales and the number of geographic segments) are 
significantly negatively related to management earnings forecast precision. This was the 
expected relationship. Regarding forecast accuracy, contrary to expectations, forecast 
accuracy is positively related to multinationality, with regard to the number of 
geographic segments a firm discloses. Regarding forecast bias, unexpectedly, two 
measures of multinationality (foreign sales / total sales and number of countries with 
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foreign subsidiaries) are significantly positively related to more optimistic management 
earnings forecasts.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Business firms compete in a global marketplace. The more areas of the globe in 
which a firm operates, the more multinational it becomes. “Degree of multinationality” 
refers to the joint effects of the number of countries in which a firm has operations and 
the significance of those operations. This idea has also been referred to as “degree of 
internationalization” (Sullivan 1994), “international diversification” (Hitt et al. 1994), 
“foreign diversification” (Erwin and Perry 2000), and “multinational firm complexity” 
(Grant et al. 2000). The impact of operating in a multinational setting is multifaceted.  
Management earnings forecasts are very important to perceptions about the 
financial strength of a company, particularly those companies publicly traded in the 
capital markets. Meeting or exceeding earnings forecasts is a widely accepted goal of 
corporate management. This study examines the effect of multinationality on the 
precision, accuracy, and bias of management earnings forecasts. The study seeks to 
answer the question: Do higher levels of multinationality lead to less precision, less 
accuracy, and downward bias in management earnings forecasts? 
An extensive research stream has examined management earnings forecasts. A 
management earnings forecast is a voluntary disclosure of management’s estimate of 
firm profits or earnings per share for a period. Theory suggest that management is 
motivated to issue an earnings forecast to adjust earnings expectations that arise due to 
the information asymmetry between management and investors (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; 
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McNichols 1989; King et al. 1990). The desired expectation adjustment may be either 
positive (Miller 2002) or negative (e.g., Kaznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1994).  Other 
theories on management incentives to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts include 1) 
to signal investors regarding management’s ability to anticipate economic changes and 
adjust production plans (Trueman 1986), 2) to avoid litigation (Skinner 1994; Kasznik 
and Lev 1995; Baginski et al. 2002), 3) to reduce asymmetry before new capital 
offerings (Ruland et al. 1990), and 4) to reduce information asymmetry prior to a 
management sale of firm securities to both increase the stock price and prevent charges 
of trading on inside information (Noe 1999). 
This study is motivated by the growing importance of multinationality in the 
economy (Meek and Thomas 2004).  There has been little research to date on how the 
increase in multinationality has affected management earnings forecasts.   While 
multinationality is an obvious proxy for complexity, it is a particular type of complexity.  
Both domestic and international business firms with multilayered operations are subject 
to environmental complexities that make the task of forecasting more difficult, but the 
complexities associated with international trade are experienced only by multinational 
firms. 
Figure 1 presents a model of information flows mediated by the various border 
crossings inherent in global operations.  Information asymmetry between management 
and outside stakeholders is more pronounced for firms operating in a complex 
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environment.  Multinational firms operate in a more complex environment relative to 
strictly domestic firms (Cheng et al. 1997; Duru and Reeb 2002).  
The costs of information to outside stakeholders increase as the degree of 
multinationality increases (Grant et. al 2000; Duru and Reeb 2002). The degree of 
multinationality increases with the number of border crossings, i.e., the extent to which 
foreign subsidiaries operate in environments that differ significantly from that of the 
parent. Geographic distance, cultural, legal, political and economic differences between 
the home and host countries, and differences in information infrastructure increase the 
costs of gathering and analyzing information. “Information infrastructure” in this sense 
refers to the presence of international business news organizations. Associated Press, 
Reuters, CNN, and other news providers cover some geographic areas more thoroughly 
than others. This difficulty of gathering and analyzing information is particularly 
pronounced for foreign subsidiaries using a business model that differs from the parent 
firm’s business model (i.e., unrelated diversification). 
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FIGURE 1 
Information Flows of Subsidiary and Parent Information to Investors and Analysts 
Each subsidiary operates in an environment that may differ substantially from the parent 
creating a complex operating, reporting, and information environment.  Environmental 
differences that may contribute to complexity are cultural (c), legal system (l), political 
risk (p), exchange rate variability (x), geographic distance between parent and 
subsidiaries (g), differences in information technology (t), and differences in accounting 
standards (a).  
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While not specifically a factor associated strictly with international operations, 
unrelated diversification has been cited as affecting multinational performance and 
increases complexity and difficulty of financial analysis (Erwin and Perry 2000).   
Given a higher cost of information to analysts relative to management, 
information asymmetry and investor uncertainty increase with an increase in the degree 
of firm multinationality. Miller (1972) hypothesizes that environmental complexity 
beyond an optimal level reduces the conceptual level with which investors comprehend 
financial information. Plumlee (2003) finds evidence to support the hypothesis that 
analysts find it difficult to assimilate relatively more complex information. As in the 
earlier studies, more recent studies indicate that information asymmetry increases as 
environmental complexity increases.  
The same factors that contribute to increasing stakeholder uncertainty regarding 
earnings, and potentially cause investor expectations to diverge from management 
expectations, also complicate the process of producing an earnings estimate.  
Multinational firms must communicate with subsidiaries and aggregate subsidiary 
earnings across different operating environments. The challenges of communicating 
across borders are further exacerbated by the principal-agent relationship between the 
parent and foreign subsidiaries (Jensen and Meckling 1976; O'Donnell 1996; Roth and 
O'Donnell 2000).  Foreign subsidiaries are in competition for firm resources and act in 
the best interest of the subsidiary. 
Table 1 lists some of the factors that impede information flow across borders. 
Poor information flow increases management uncertainty due to reduced information. 
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This management uncertainty may work against finding the hypothesized relationships.  
Verrecchia (1990) shows analytically that management uncertainty increases the 
voluntary disclosure threshold. In other words, as the quality of managers’ private 
information decreases, managers are less likely to voluntarily disclose. This suggests that 
firms with higher quality information will have a higher propensity to issue earnings 
forecasts. Since firms with high multinationality are hypothesized to have lower quality 
information, they are less likely to be included in the sample because they are less likely 
to forecast earnings. 
The degree of multinationality increases the divergence of earnings expectations 
between analysts and management, and the same factors responsible for this divergence 
also make earnings forecast more difficult. This study examines the proposition that 
management will issue less accurate and more conservative forecasts as the degree of 
multinationality increases. Forecast precision is also affected.  Studies have shown that 
forecast precision decreases as uncertainty increases (King et al. 1990; Hassell et al. 
1988). Due to greater uncertainty in earnings, earnings forecasts are expected to be less 
precise as the degree of multinationality increases.  
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TABLE 1 
Impediments to the Collection and Transmission of Accounting Information Across 
Cultural Borders or Geographic Distance 
 
 
Structural Issues      Cultural Issues         
Weekends and Time Zones     Regional Credit Practices 
Computer Compatibility     Local Business Standards 
English Language Skills     Bargaining 
Payroll        Bureaucracy 
Country-specific GAAP     Personal Connections 
Documentation      Lack of Transparency 
Price Differentials          
From Beard and Al-Rai (1999). 
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The impact of multinationality on earnings forecast bias is particularly important 
in light of the Das et al. (1998) study.  They find that analysts issue more optimistic 
forecasts for low predictability firms than for high predictability firms. Conservative 
forecasts are biased downward in that they are systematically less than earnings 
realization. Management is motivated to issue pessimistically biased earnings forecasts 
to avoid negative earnings surprises (Degeorge et al. 1999; Brown 2001). Negative 
earnings surprises have a disproportionate effect on stock prices (Lopez and Rees 2002; 
Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002).  In the presence of optimistic earnings forecasts, 
managers are motivated to adjust analysts’ and investors’ expectation downward to 
avoid disproportionate stock price effects. 
This study is important because it extends the literature regarding the effect of 
foreign operations on business reporting as it pertains to management earnings forecasts 
(Meek and Thomas 2004). As globalization of firm operations increases the portion of 
earnings from foreign operations, investors and analysts should have an awareness of the 
effect, if any, that foreign operations have on voluntary management disclosure.   
Prior studies (Duru and Reeb 2002; Erwin and Perry 2000) have shown that 
international diversification is associated with less accurate analysts’ forecasts.  The 
effect of multinationality on management earnings forecasts, however, has not been 
examined. Studies have considered multinational forecasts (Das and Saudagaran 1998; 
Fulkerson and Meek 1998), but these studies have focused on other aspects of the 
multinational firm such as Form 20-F reconciliations or the relationship of market cross-
listings to analysts’ forecasts. Other multinational-oriented studies have examined the 
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ability of geographic segment disclosures in SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 to add to forecast 
accuracy (Nichols, et. al. 1995; Nichols, et. al. 1996; Hermann and Thomas 2000). 
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) present a model of forecast precision using segment 
disclosures. Segment disclosures speak to the degree of multinationality. Herrmann and 
Thomas (2000), however, do not specifically address management earnings forecasts. 
International voluntary disclosure studies (Meek, et. al 1995; Frost and Pownall 1994) 
have been in the context of annual report voluntary disclosures and not management 
forecasts. 
This study builds on a model developed by Baginski and Hassell (1997) to 
examine forecast precision. This model sets forecast precision as a function of the degree 
of multinationality.  Models of forecast accuracy and bias are common in this literature 
(Duru and Reeb 2002; Das et al. 1998) and similarly set accuracy and bias as a function 
of the predictor variable, in this case the degree of multinationality.  Control variables 
for size, length of forecast horizon, analysts following, firm diversification, and earnings 
volatility are consistent with prior research.   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Section II addresses 
relevant literature. Section III discusses attributes of multinational operations that affect 
information flows.  Section IV develops the hypotheses. Section V presents the research 
methodology. Section VI presents the results of the tests of hypotheses. Section VII 
provides the summary, limitations, and future extensions of the study. 
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II. RELEVANT LITERATURE  
This study is at the intersection of research on the effects of multinationality on 
firm operations and performance, and management earnings forecasts. This section 
reviews relevant literature in these two areas. This section also reviews literature on the 
meaning and measurement of multinationality. 
This study posits that the degree of multinationality decreases earnings forecast 
precision and accuracy, and increases downward bias because of an increase in 
complexity and uncertainty of firm operations. This increased complexity and 
uncertainty arises from three distinct but related effects of multinationality that all 
contribute to making forecasting more difficult for the parent firm. Effects of 
multinationality include the following: (1) difficulties in communicating across borders, 
(2) a principal-agent relationship between the domestic parent and foreign subsidiary, 
and (3) an increase in various risks associated with increasing the degree of 
multinationality. This section presents prior relevant research concerning operational 
complexities inherent in multinational operations that may affect management earnings 
forecasts.  
Management Earnings Forecasts 
Baginski et al. (1993) show an association between management forecast 
precision and uncertainty.  Managers who have a higher degree of certainty regarding 
earnings issue more precise earnings estimates. The implication is that those events and 
environmental factors that contribute to uncertainty result in less precision and accuracy 
in management forecasts. 
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An extensive management forecast literature has examined both upstream and 
downstream issues relevant to management forecasts.  These studies have examined the 
determinants of management forecast accuracy, precision, venue, and timing, and 
consequences of management forecasts for analysts, investors, and security prices.  
Recent research has focused on the relationship of management forecast to financial 
analysts forecasts revisions (Hassell et. al. 1988; Baginski and Hassell 1990), equity 
valuation (Baginski et. al. 1993), auditor quality (McConomy 1998), earnings 
management (Kaznik 1999), and the effect on other firms in the industry (Baginski 
1987).   
Studies have examined the effect of prior management forecast accuracy on 
investor expectations (Hirst et al. 1999) and management forecast as warnings in the 
face of earnings surprise (Kaznik and Lev 1995). Hirst et al. (1999) provide evidence 
that investor expectations are influenced by prior management's forecast accuracy 
interacting with the forecast form. 
Most earnings forecast studies fit into a three-stage model of voluntary disclosure 
developed by King et al. (1990). The first decision managers must make is whether to 
voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts or other information. The second decision in their 
model is whether to issue private forecast through analysts or used public channels.  
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) precludes sharing information with only analysts so this 
option and decision point is no longer a consideration. The last decision in their model, 
“tertiary choices regarding public forecast disclosure,” is concerned with the details of 
the disclosure such as precision, venue, timing, and ancillary information. The current 
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study examines whether the degree of multinationality influences the precision, 
accuracy, and bias of management forecasts. 
Early papers (Patell 1976, Ainkya and Gift 1984) showed that management 
earnings forecasts move markets, i.e., are new information to the markets.  Like other 
disclosures, both voluntary and mandatory, management earnings forecasts reduce 
information asymmetry and, in turn, reduce investor uncertainty and ultimately reduce 
the costs of capital to the firm.     
The effect of management earnings forecasts to lower the costs of capital is of 
particular importance to corporations. On the one hand, firms that have the greatest 
information asymmetry can benefit the most by reducing that asymmetry. On the other 
hand, the very reasons that create the asymmetry make accumulating the information 
needed to make forecasts more costly. Arguably, those firms whose operations cross 
multiple borders may be motivated to issue conservative and less precise earnings 
forecasts because of the additional costs of aggregating earnings information across 
borders. Due to greater information asymmetry as firms increase in multinationality, 
firms would receive greater benefit from making more precise, more accurate, and less 
biased forecasts and could therefore afford greater costs to provide these forecasts.   
Effects of Multinationality on Firm Operations and Performance 
Past studies have examined information flows across borders (e.g. Egelhoff 
1991).  A basic assumption of this study is that the process of aggregating information 
across borders degrades the signal and increases the difficulty of accurately forecasting 
earnings.   
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Management literature is filled with research on multinational performance and 
voluntary disclosure. Information asymmetry occurs between management and other 
stakeholders. Management will voluntarily disclose information and reduce this 
information asymmetry for a variety of reasons (e.g., lower cost of capital; reduce 
liability in case of losses). A key insight is that foreign subsidiaries are motivated to 
manage the information flow to the home office for many of the same reasons as the 
parent seeks to manage information flow to investors. Agency issues exist between the 
foreign subsidiary and parent. Foreign subsidiaries have their own agenda. While this is 
true of all parent-subsidiary relations, the border-crossing aspect of multinational 
operations adds a unique aspect to the relationship not present in purely domestic 
organizations. Foreign subsidiaries are likely to have varying degrees of “truthful 
upward communication of private information” (Chow et al. 2000). 
Measurement and Meaning of Multinationality 
Sullivan (1994) convincingly argues that the degree of multinationality is a 
complex concept and that traditional measures of multinationality such as “Foreign 
Sales/Total Sales” or “Foreign Assets/Total Assets” do not fully capture this complexity. 
He states, “Notwithstanding variation in their [multinational firms’] absolute and relative 
internationalization, scholars typically treat multinational corporations (MNCs) as 
isomorphic in their sampling method.” He goes on to suggest that this introduces error 
into the sampling.  He prefers the use of a “Degree of Internationalization” index 
composed of the factors that he found to be significantly related to the multifaceted 
concept.  These factors are Foreign Sales/Total Sales, Foreign Assets/Total Assets, top 
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managers’ international experience, overseas subsidiaries as a percentage of total 
subsidiaries, and the psychic dispersion of international operations (measured by 
location of firm subsidiaries within the ten psychic zones identified by prior research).  
Some accounting researchers (Duru and Reeb 2002; Belkaoui 2002) have embraced the 
use of an index to capture the degree of multinationality.    
This study uses various measures of the degree of multinationality to capture the 
depth and breadth facets of multinational operations. Two frequently used measures of 
multinationality are Foreign Sales/Total Sales and Foreign Assets/Total Assets. This 
may not accurately reflect the number of “border crossings” with which the firm must 
contend. For example, a Detroit firm with significant foreign sales and assets only in 
Windsor, Canada will not have the communication and coordination problems of a firm 
with subsidiaries in several countries. The number of geographic segments is suggestive 
of firm breadth; other studies have used the number of countries in which a firm has a 
subsidiary. Firms operating in a number of geographic segments will have greater 
operational complexity, but the effect on firm operations is moderated by the 
contribution each of these makes to total firm operations. The number of countries in 
which a firm lists a subsidiary is another measure of firm breadth. Nguyen and Crosset 
(1995) caution researchers against comparing results across studies that use different 
measures of multinationality, and show that different measures can lead to different 
results.   
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III. ATTRIBUTES AFFECTING INFORMATION FLOW IN  
MULTINATIONAL  FIRMS 
Several attributes of multinationality affect information flow in multinational 
firms. Among these are geographic and cultural distance, legal system and accounting 
standards, technological standards, and agency and monitoring considerations. Each of 
these attributes of information flow in multinational firms increases the costs of 
aggregating information necessary to provide earnings forecasts.   Besides data 
collection and processing, Gray et al. (1990) list several other factors that constrain 
voluntary information disclosure in U.S. and U.K firms.  These include the cost of 
competitive disadvantage, cost of auditing, possibility of claims form employees or trade 
unions, threat of takeover or merger, cost of publication, technical processing problems, 
the possibility of intervention by government agencies, the possibility of claims from 
political or consumer groups, and the possibility of intervention by taxation authorities.   
Geographic and Cultural Distance 
 
Geographical and cultural distance affects management communications to the 
home office and increase uncertainty with regard to foreign subsidiary performance.  
George and Jones (1996), in their discussion of communication and decision-making, 
indicate:  
Global expansion greatly increases the problems associated with 
organizational communication and decision-making. Basic language 
differences make encoding and decoding messages difficult, and physical 
distances and differences in time zones further complicate the communication 
process. (George and Jones 1996, 565) 
 
Similarly, Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997) point out:  
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As cultural distance increases, the challenges for the organizational control 
system increase proportionately because complete and accurate information 
about agent performance becomes more difficult and expensive to obtain.  
 
A major global communication issue facing business firms is cross-cultural 
understanding and diversity (Geddie 1999). The reduced understanding associated with 
greater multinationality manifests itself in two ways. First, referring to the additional risk 
incurred by investors in MNCs, Caves (1996) points out,  
These include the political risks of being unable to deter the hostile action of a 
foreign government, the economic risks implicit in the higher costs of 
information about the foreign environments (one buys less than complete 
information, and so faces greater risks)… (Caves 1996, 150) 
 
Second, management’s understanding of subsidiary operations is affected by the 
degree of multinationality. Beard and Al-Rai (1999) describe communication and 
coordination problems associated with a U.S. parent, a low-context culture, and 
subsidiaries located in a high-context culture (Hall 1976). These studies detail structural 
and cultural issues that impede the flow of information from subsidiary to parent (cf., 
Table 1). Structural issues include weekends and time zones, computer compatibility, 
English language skills, country-specific GAAP, documentation, and price differentials. 
Cultural issues include regional credit practices, local business standards, bargaining, 
bureaucracy, personal connections, and lack of transparency. 
Chow et al. (2000) provide evidence that the degree of misrepresentation in 
information flows from subordinates to superiors varies by culture. The difficulties of 
integrating culturally diverse operations are also explored in Park et al. (1996). Their 
study of communication difficulties is in the context of U.S. firms with subsidiaries in 
South Korea.  They state:  
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Communication problems in foreign subsidiaries stem from a variety of 
sources and lead to a number of negative consequences for both parent 
country and host country managers.  (Park 1996, 79) 
 
Legal System and Accounting Standards 
 
Differences in legal systems, including tax systems, restrictions on capital 
movement, changing trade agreements and developments in international laws and court 
cases, between the two countries increase the complexity of preparing accurate earnings 
estimates. Differences in accounting standards add even more complexity in doing 
business between two countries (Salter and Smith 1996). 
Patricia L. O’Malley (2004), board member of the International Accounting 
Standards Board, in her address to the International Accounting section of the American 
Accounting Association, cited reduction of financial statement preparation costs as a 
benefit of standards harmonization. Conversion of multiple GAAPS can be a substantial 
cost. Firms with tens and even hundreds of subsidiaries must deal with converting host 
country financial statements into home country financial statements. The knowledge of 
both home and host country GAAP required of financial statement preparers to 
accomplish the roll up of subsidiary statements is challenging and may increase the rate 
of error occurrence. 
Technological Standards 
Rapid advances in information technology have had a revolutionary impact on 
global business. Linking information networks across borders often involves different 
hardware and software standards (Smith et al. 2003). As technology has become 
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available to link systems using differing configurations of hardware and software, this 
difficulty besetting cross-border communications is easing to some extent. 
Basic financial data transmitted to the home office on a routine basis should not 
be subject to noise in the communication channel to the same extent as qualitative 
information (Egelhoff 1991). Qualitative information that does not easily fit in a 
standardized format, but is valuable to the home office in predicting future performance, 
is much more subject to noise in the communication process. This communication is also 
generally via an “information poor” medium of written communications as opposed to 
the more “information rich” medium of face-to-face communication. Firms that have a 
high degree of multinationality generally have a higher degree of both cumulative 
geographic and cultural distance between the home office and subsidiaries. The resulting 
“noise” in intra-MNC communications reduces the reliability with which managers can 
predict earnings.  MNC communications with analysts and shareholders will reflect this 
reduced reliability.    
Agency and Monitoring Considerations 
 
Foreign subsidiaries and employees on different sides of various borders from the 
domestic parent firm are much more difficult to monitor and are likely to have agendas 
of their own that may or may not be congruent with parent firm goals. While the firm as 
a whole may have policies against earnings manipulation, subsidiaries sequestered 
behind numerous monitoring-impairing borders (e.g., geographic and linguistic) may be 
motivated to manipulate earnings, particularly in light of competition between 
subsidiaries for scarce resources (Mudambi and Navarra 2004). This line of reasoning 
   
 
 
 
19 
 
ties the paper to the question about the efficacy of multinational audits. Prior studies 
indicate that auditing across borders is more susceptible to audit failures. Research 
shows that audit quality is affected by different cultures (Salter and Smith 1996).    
Multinational enterprises operate in a variety of geographically, culturally, 
technologically, politically, legally and economically diverse environments, and are 
subject to risks beyond those of domestic firms. These antecedent conditions require 
complex management information, reporting and control systems (Hamilton and 
Kashlak 1999; Egelhoff 1991). Figure 1 illustrates the information flows necessary for 
management, investors, and analysts to arrive at earnings expectations.  Information 
regarding foreign operations flows to both management and to investors and analysts.   
As firms increase their level of multinationality, geographic and cultural distance, legal 
systems (including capital restrictions and corporate governance issues), political risks, 
exchange rate risks, and differences in information infrastructure (i.e., availability and 
sophistication of business news media covering firm operations) all contribute to 
operational and reporting complexity. This diversity of operating environments and 
complexity of accounting information systems makes forecasting foreign earnings 
difficult for management, financial analysts and investors. 
Grant et al. (2000) show that the number of analysts following a firm decreases 
with the level of multinationality as measured by lines of businesses and geographic 
operating regions. Complexity drives up the costs of information acquisition and 
analysis and generates “results in multiple-earnings-return relationships that are more 
difficult to understand,” (p. 5).  Since fewer analysts follow MNCs with greater breadth, 
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the information available to shareholders is reduced. The complexity of extreme 
multinationality that drives analysts away similarly affects management in their efforts 
to acquire and analyze information from foreign subsidiaries.    
Jensen and Meckling (1976, 308) define an agency relationship as, “a contract 
under which one or more (principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent.”  Agency theory suggests that managers of foreign subsidiaries, as agents for the 
domestic parent/shareholder, are motivated to pursue strategies that maximize their own 
wealth.  This may include many of the same strategies that the parent firm uses in 
relations with current and prospective owners (earnings and expectations management).  
Firms operating in a diversity of cultural and technological environments may find it 
more difficult to arrive at efficient contracts and monitor subsidiary operations.  This 
will increase uncertainty with regard to estimating earnings.   
Kwok and Reeb (2000), Reeb et al. (1998), Bartov et al. (1996) have provided 
evidence that the effect of international diversification on risk depends on the 
combination of home and host countries. Kwok and Reeb (2000) find evidence that 
firms from stable economies increase their risk when they invest in less stable economies 
and firms from less stable economies decrease their risk when they invest in more stable 
economies. Since the sample is U. S. firms, a stable economy, this finding suggests that 
nearly all U.S. investments abroad will increase risk. Firms with a greater degree of 
multinationality are more likely to be invested in increasingly less stable economies.  
This suggests that volatility increases with the degree of multinationality. Earnings 
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volatility should decrease forecast accuracy and precision and encourage management to 
guide earnings downward.   
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IV. HYPOTHESES 
 
The hypotheses are based on the expectation that the degree of multinationality 
will increase management uncertainty with regard to earnings, which will in turn affect 
management forecasts.   Greater uncertainty is associated with a range forecast (Hirst, et 
al. 1999, Rapoport et al. 1990) rather than a point forecast.  The predicted relationship is 
similar to that found by Duru and Reeb (2002) for analysts’ forecasts and is consistent 
with the Das et al. (1998) finding that forecast bias is a function of the predictability of 
earnings.  The hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a higher degree of multinationality will issue less 
precise earnings forecasts. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a higher degree of multinationality will issue less 
accurate earnings forecasts. 
Hypothesis 3: Earnings forecasts of firms with a higher degree of 
multinationality will be biased downwards. 
These hypotheses are rooted in the proposition that the additional costs of 
aggregating earnings information across borders will be problematic given the 
uncertainty created by multiple border-crossings.  Gray et al. (1990) find that quantified 
forecasts are perceived by managers in the U.S. and U.K. as incurring major net costs.  
Firms that desire the benefits associated with voluntary disclosure will choose a lower 
level of precision and accuracy, and hedge their quantified forecasts by intentionally 
indicating lower than expected earnings.   
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V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Methodology 
 
This study uses four alternative specifications of the variable of interest, i.e., 
multinationality. The degree of multinationality is measured by Foreign Sales/Total 
Sales, Foreign Assets/Total Assets, the number of geographic segments listed by the 
firm, and the number of countries in which the firm lists subsidiaries. 
   The hypotheses are tested using the following regression: 
(H1) PREi (H2) ACCi, (H3) BIASi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2FHORIZONi +  
 3VOLATi + 4LSIZEi + 5DIVi  +  6ANL  + i    
where:  
PREi  = 3 for point estimates, 2 for range estimates, 1 for open-interval  
forecasts, and zero for general impression forecasts.   
ACCi  = the absolute value of (forecasted earnings less actual  
  earnings)/actual earnings). 
BIASi   = (forecasted earnings less actual earnings)/actual earnings. 
DOMi          = FS/TS, FA/TA, number of geographic segments, and number of 
foreign subsidiaries, respectively. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous 
five-year period.  
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size. Total sales for the forecasted period. 
DIVi  = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the  
  firm had operations. 
ANLi = number of I/B/E/S analysts issuing forecasts for the firm in the 
month prior to the forecast. 
 
Hypothesis 1 concerns the relationship between the degree of multinationality 
and management earnings forecast precision, and is tested by the methodology described 
in Baginski and Hassell (1997). As in Baginski and Hassell (1997), logistic regression is 
used to examine the relationship between the ordinal dependent variable and the variable 
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of interest.  Logistic regression is the appropriate statistical technique given that the 
dependent variable is ordinal (McCullagh 1980), displays multivariate nonnormality 
(Press and Wilson 1978), and that the sample size is large relative to the number of 
variables (Stone and Rasp 1991).  
Management forecast can be either quantitative or qualitative.  Quantitative 
forecasts can be a point estimate, range, or an open-interval estimate (greater than or less 
than forecasts).  Qualitative forecasts are general expressions of good or bad news.  
These forecasts represent a decreasing order of precision.  As in Baginski and Hassell 
(1997), point, range, open-interval, and general impression forecasts are coded 3, 2, 1, 
and 0.   
Hypothesis 2 predicts that forecast accuracy will be reduced as the degree of 
multinationality increases. Forecasts accuracy is calculated as the absolute value of the 
forecast less the actual earnings for the period and divided by the actual earnings. 
Scaling forecast error by actual earnings is consistent with prior research (Erwin and 
Perry 2000; Hassell and Jennings 1986; Richards et al. 1977).    
          FORECASTi – EARNi 
 ACCURACYi    =    abs. value   ______________________ 
                   EARNi  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that earnings forecasts will become increasingly negatively 
biased as the degree of multinationality increases.  Bias is calculated as:  
        FORECASTi – EARNi  
 BIASi    =         _______________________ 
    EARNi   
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ACC measures the absolute error in the forecast without regard to sign.  It is 
expected to be negatively associated with the degree of multinationality. 
BIAS measures the sign of the forecast error.  Conservative forecasts are below 
realized earnings.  As the degree of multinationality increases, forecasts are expected to 
become more conservative. 
Size (LSIZE) is a proxy for the amount of public information available (Atiase 
1985).  Multinational firms are usually larger than strictly domestic firms. Size is 
associated with a more complex environment, which should increase uncertainty and 
forecast variability. This variable is calculated as the natural log of the firm’s total sales.
 FHORIZON is the time between the forecast and the period end.  Prior studies 
(Das and Saudagaran 1998; Brown 1993) have shown that forecasts with a greater 
horizon are less accurate. Kang et al. (1994) and Das et al. (1998) provide evidence that 
forecasts over a longer horizon are more optimistic. Forecast horizon is calculated as the 
number of days between the management forecasts and the year-end divided by 30.   
VOLAT measures earnings volatility. Earnings volatility increases the difficulty 
in making an accurate forecast. Firms with higher volatility are more likely to issue 
conservative earnings guidance given the penalties for missing earnings targets. In a 
study of analysts’ forecasts, Das et al. (1998) found that forecast bias is a function of 
earnings predictability. VOLAT is measured by the standard deviation of the return on 
assets for the previous five-year period before the period forecasted. 
DIV measures firm industrial diversification.  Prior research on the effect of 
multinationality on analysts’ forecasts suggests that accuracy declines with greater 
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diversification (Erwin and Perry 2000). Arguably, this additional complexity would also 
affect manager’s ability to forecast earnings. This variable is measured by the number of 
unique primary and secondary SIC codes listed for the firm in the Mergent Online 
database. 
ANL is the number of analysts forecasting earnings per share for the month 
immediately preceding the management forecast.  This variable is consistent with both 
Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Duru and Reeb (2002).  Baginski and Hassell found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between analysts following and management 
forecast precision.   This is somewhat counterintuitive.  By producing more precise 
forecast, managers may be seen to drive out private information production and reduce 
the number of analysts following the firm.  Higher precision, however, attracts additional 
analysts.   A higher degree of precision allows analysts to reduce the weighting of 
privately acquired information and reduces uncertainty in the forecast revision process.  
Following a firm with more precise forecasts reduces analysts’ risk of producing a 
significantly deviant forecast. Multinationality increases the costs of private information 
production. As firms become more multinational, fewer analysts should be willing to 
incur the additional costs of information acquisition across borders. The DOM variable 
is expected to include some of the variation that previously would have been captured in 
the ANL variable.   
Data 
Sample management earnings forecasts are drawn from the First Call “Company 
Issued Guidance” database.  The database provides data for 19,757 management 
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forecasts of annual earnings.  Forecasts in the initial sample include only U.S. firms that 
do not have a significant event such as a merger or accounting change during the period 
covered by the forecast.  Starting at the beginning of the alphabetical list of companies, 
companies with some degree of Foreign Sales were selected.  Of the sample of 313 firms 
selected, 38 firms were eliminated due to incomplete information. An additional 12 
observations were eliminated as being influential observations as determined by standard 
diagnostic statistics (studentized residuals, dffits, dfbetas).  Firms operating in financial 
and regulated industries are excluded from the sample.  These firms have additional 
reporting requirements that may affect the type, accuracy and bias of management 
forecasts.  
Data necessary for calculating the Foreign Sales / Total Sales, Foreign Assets / 
Total Assets, and the number of geographic segments were obtained from Compustat, as 
was actual earnings for the period forecasted.  The number of foreign subsidiaries, return 
on asset data, and SIC code information was obtained from Mergent Online.  
Accuracy (ACC) and Bias (BIAS) are calculated from the forecasted earnings 
from First Call and the actual earnings from Compustat. Prior research uses an unscaled 
measure of accuracy and bias (Das and Saudagaran 1998). 
The precision variable (PRE) is coded 0, 1, 2, 3 based on the Company Issued 
Guideline (CIG) codes in First Call (see Appendix). “0” represents general impression 
forecasts; “1” represents open-ended forecasts (forecasts that set an upper or lower 
bound); “2 “represent range forecasts; and “3” represents point forecasts. Codes were 
assigned by a panel of four accounting and finance faculty using a one-iteration Delphi 
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technique. Table 2 presents the sample distributions for tests of management forecasts by 
year, precision, and firms. Appendix provides the coding of First Call Management 
Earnings Forecasts. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Distributions for Tests of Management Earnings Forecasts 
 
By Forecast Year: 
2001    105 
2002    158 
      Total   263 
 
By Forecast Precision (sample code): 
 
 Point (3)        64 
 Closed-interval (range) (2)  175 
 Open-interval (1)     21 
 General impression (0)      3 
     Total    263 
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VI. RESULTS 
Multinationality and Management Forecast Precision 
Descriptive statistics for the tests of earnings forecast precision are presented in 
Table 3. Correlation statistics are presented in Table 4. 
Results of tests of management forecast precision using various measures of 
multinationality are provided below. The dependent variable (PRE) is coded as 0, 1, 2, 3 
as management earnings forecasts go from least precise (general impression forecasts) to 
the most precise (point estimates).   
Table 5 specifies degree of multinationality as Foreign Sales/Total Sales (n=241).  
The Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio is 24.513 (p=0.0004) for this model.  The coefficient 
for this degree of multinationality measure is significantly negative (p=0.0190) 
indicating that as multinationality increases firms issue less precise forecasts. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. FHORIZON is significantly positive (p=0.0358). This 
indicates that as the time between the management earnings forecast and the end of the 
period forecasted increases the forecast becomes more precise. This is a surprising result 
inconsistent with the direction predicted and prior research. Bagniski and Hassell (1997) 
found a strongly significant negative relationship between forecast horizon and forecast 
precision.  DIV is also significantly positive in this model specification (p=0.0206).  
This is also a surprising result.  A positive relationship suggests that as the operational 
diversity increases (the number of SIC codes increases) management earnings forecast 
become more precise. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Tests of Management Earnings Forecasts, for a Sample of 263 Firm-Year Observations for the 
Period 2001-2002 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
        
Dependent Variables      
 Forecast Precision (PRE)   2.16   0.59  0   2   3 
            Negative Absolute Forecast Error (ACC)   0.42   1.70  0   0.08 21.22 
 Signed Forecast Error (BIAS)   0.33   1.72  -1.75   0.00 21.22 
Hypothesized Variable      
 Degree of Multinationality (DOM)      
  Foreign Sales/Total Sales     0.33   0.17  0.03   0.31   0.71 
  Foreign Assets/Total Assets   0.24   0.14  0.03   0.17   0.71 
  # Geographic Segments   2.61   1.81  1.00   3.00   9.00 
  # Countries  21.30 18.25  1.00 15.00 82.00 
Control Variables      
 Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)   7.16   4.14  0.11   6.96 24.49 
 Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)   5.35   7.54  0.90   3.63 42.29 
 Firm Size (LSIZE)   8.10   1.19  5.51   8.12 10.11 
 Industry Diversification (DIV)   3.22   1.60  1.00   3.00   6.00 
 Number of Analysts (ANL) 12.77   7.69  1.00 12.00 32.00 
 
Note: Precision (PRE) is forecast precision coded 3 for point forecasts, 2 for range forecasts, 1 for open -interval forecasts, and zero for general impression forecasts.  Accuracy (ACC) is the 
absolute forecast error; BIAS is the signed forecast error, defined as the difference between the management earnings forecast and the actual earnings, divided by the actual earnings; Degree 
of multinationality (DOM) is computed using four separate measures – the foreign sales ratio (Foreign Sales/ Total Sales), foreign asset ratio (Foreign Assets/ Total Assets), the number of 
geographic segments, and the # of countries in which the firm has a subsidiary; Industrial diversification (DIV) is the number of SIC codes in which the firm had operations; Firm size 
(LSIZE) is the log of total sales for the period; Forecast horizon (FHORIZON) is the number of days between forecast date and the end of the forecasted period divided by 30; Earnings 
volatility (VOLAT) is the standard deviation of the return on assets for the five year period preceding the forecasted year during the month preceding the month of the forecast; Analysts 
following (ANL) is the number of I/B/E/S analysts following the firm at the time of the forecasts.
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TABLE 4 
Results of Correlation Analysis 
 
 
 ACC BIAS FS/TS  FA/TA #CTY #GS FHORIZON VOLAT  LSIZE DIV ANL 
ACC   0.98***  0.19*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.02  0.16***  0.01 -0.05 -0.13**  0.03 
BIAS  0.98   0.21*** -0.04 -0.01 -0.00  0.16**  0.02 -0.04 -0.09  0.04 
DOM 
  FS/TS 
 0.19***  0.21***   0.67***  0.52***  0.37**  0.05  0.07  0.07 -0.01  0.30*** 
  FA/TA -0.02 -0.04  0.67***   0.41***  0.20  0.02  0.16  0.07 -0.10  0.11 
  #CTY -0.04 -0.01  0.52***  0.41***   0.10  0.01 -0.08  0.44***  0.08  0.36*** 
#Geographic 
Segments 
(GS) 
-0.02 -0.00  0.37***  0.20  0.09   0.01  0.07 -0.06  0.09  0.07 
FHORIZON  0.16***  0.16**  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.01   0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.01 
VOLAT  0.01  0.02  0.08  0.16 -0.08  0.07  0.01   0.12**  0.10  0.11* 
LSIZE  -0.05 -0.04  0.07  0.07  0.44*** -0.06 -0.01  0.12**   0.22***  0.55*** 
DIV -0.13** -0.09 -0.01 -0.10  0.09  0.09 -0.02  0.10  0.22***  -0.16** 
ANL  0.03  0.04  0.30***  0.11  0.36***  0.07  0.01  0.11*  0.55*** -0.16**  
____________________________________ 
 
Note:  ***, **, * Significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Tests of the Association between 
Multinaionality and Management Forecast Precision, after Controlling for Other 
Determinants of Forecast Precision - DOM = Foreign Sales/ Total Sales (n= 241) 
 
PREi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i  
 
 Estimate Chi-square     p-value 
Hypothesized Variable    
    
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM – FS/TS) -2.102 5.501 0.0190 
    
Control Variables    
    
    Forecast Horizon  (FHORIZON)   0.0738 4.405 0.0358 
    
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)   0.003 0.011 0.9164 
    
    Firm Size (LSIZE)   0.1561 0.9005  0.3426 
    
    Operational Diversity  (DIV)   0.246 5.358 0.0206 
    
    Analyst Following  (ANL) -0.027 1.133 0.2871 
 
 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 24.513    (p = 0.0004) 
________________________________________________ 
 
PREi  = 3 for point estimates, 2 for range estimates, 1 for open-interval  
forecasts, and zero for general impression forecasts.   
DOMi          = Foreign Sales / Total Sales. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi  = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the management 
earnings forecast.  
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Table 6 specifies degree of multinationality as Foreign Assets/Total Assets 
(n=37, number of sample firms with available data =11). The small sample size results 
from the unavailability of foreign asset data for the selected firms.  This model is not 
significant (Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio p=0.4932). The small number of total 
observations and small number of sample firms with foreign asset data preclude drawing 
any inferences from this model specification. 
Table 7 specifies degree of multinationality as the number of geographic 
segments listed by the company for the forecasted period. DOM is significantly negative 
(p=0.0873) indicating that as the number of geographic segments increase management 
issues less precise earnings forecasts. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. As in the first 
model, FHORIZON (p=0.0376) and DIV (p=0.0305) are significantly positively related 
to forecast horizon. This is counterintuitive and inconsistent with the predicted direction 
and prior research. ANL is significantly negative in this model specification (p=0.0922). 
This is inconsistent with Baginski and Hassell (1997). They found that higher precision 
was associated with more analysts following the firm’s forecasts. 
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TABLE 6 
Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Tests of the Association between 
Multinationality and Management Forecast Precision, after Controlling for Other 
Determinants of Forecast Precision - DOM = Foreign Assets/ Total Assets (n=37) 
 
PREi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i    
     
        
Estimate 
 
Chi-square     
 
p-value 
Hypothesized Variable    
    
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM - FA/TA) -1.798 0.531 0.4663 
    
Control Variables    
    
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)   0.0996 0.9877 0.3203 
    
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)   0.0206 0.0167 0.8972 
    
    Firm Size (LSIZE)    0.3274 0.1965 0.6575 
    
    Operational Diversity (DIV) -0.2589 0.2749 0.6001 
    
    Analyst Following (ANL) -0.1130 0.7883 0.3746 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 5.403    (p=0.4932) 
________________________________________________ 
 
PREi  = 3 for point estimates, 2 for range estimates, 1 for open-interval  
forecasts, and zero for general impression forecasts.   
DOMi          = Foreign Assets / Total Assets. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
     management earnings forecast.  
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TABLE 7 
Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Tests of the Association between 
Mulitnationality and Management Forecast Precision, after Controlling for Other 
Determinants of Forecast Precision - DOM = # Geographic Segments (n=241) 
 
PREi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i   
                 
 Estimate Chi-square    
   
p-value 
Hypothesized Variable    
    
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM - # Geographic 
Segments)  
-0.0130 2.924 0.0873 
    
Control Variables    
    
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON) 0.073 4.322 0.0376 
    
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT) 0.014 0.311 0.5769 
    
    Firm Size (LSIZE) 0.184 1.237 0.2623 
    
    Operational Diversity (DIV) 0.229 4.680 0.0305 
    
    Analyst Following (ANL) -0.040 2.836 0.0922 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 21.850      (p =0.013) 
________________________________________________ 
 
PREi  = 3 for point estimates, 2 for range estimates, 1 for open-interval  
forecasts, and zero for general impression forecasts.   
DOMi          =  the number of geographic segments in which the firm indicates operations. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the 
  management earnings forecast.  
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Table 8 specifies degree of multinationality as the number of countries in which 
the firm has subsidiaries.  While the model is significant (p=0.0037), the variable of 
interest is not significant (p=0.5884).   Significant control variables FHORIZON 
(p=0.0367) and DIV (p=0.0633) are positively associated with forecast precision.  ANL 
(p=0.0494) is significantly negatively associated with forecast precision.   
Overall results show mixed support for Hypothesis 1. Two of the model 
specifications for degree of multinationality show significant DOM variables. One of the 
remaining specifications has insufficient data. Findings regarding the control variables 
are consistent across specifications but inconsistent with expectations and prior research.  
This will be discussed further in the summary, limitations, and future extensions section. 
Multinationality and Management Forecast Accuracy 
Results of tests of management earnings forecast accuracy are provided below.  
The dependent variable, earnings forecast accuracy ACC, is measured as the absolute 
value of the percentage difference between earnings forecast and actual earnings, 
earnings forecast are more accurate as this difference approaches zero. ACC is zero for 
those earnings forecast that exactly predict actual earnings.  Less accurate forecasts 
increase from zero. 
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TABLE 8 
Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality and 
Management Forecast Precision, after Controlling for Other Determinants of Forecast 
Precision - DOM = # Countries with Foreign Subsidiaries (n=241) 
 
PREi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i    
     
    Estimate Chi-square  p-value 
Hypothesized Variable    
    
    Degree of Multinationality  
   (DOM - # Countries with foreign 
    subsidiaries) 
-0.004 0.293 0.5884 
        
   Control Variables    
    
   Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)      0.073 4.362 0.0367 
       
   Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)   0.011 0.1714 0.6789 
        
    Firm Size (LSIZE)   0.270 2.6747 0.1020 
    
    Operational Diversity (DIV)    0.192 0.1033 0.0633 
 
        
    Analyst Following (ANL) -0.046 3.861 0.0494 
 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 19.283     (p= 0.0037 ) 
________________________________________________ 
 
PREi  = 3 for point estimates, 2 for range estimates, 1 for open-interval  
forecasts, and zero for general impression forecasts.   
DOMi          = # of countries in which the firm list a foreign subsidiary 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period.  
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the management 
earnings forecast.  
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Table 9 presents the results of tests of hypotheses 2 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as Foreign Sales/Total Sales (n=231). The model is 
significant at the .01 level and has an adjusted R2 of 0.16. While the model is significant 
(p=0.0001), the variable of interest, FS/TS, is not significant (p=0.1916). Control 
variables LSIZE (p=0.0829) and DIV (p=0.0903) are significantly negatively associated 
with the dependent variable ACC. Since LSIZE and DIV are both significantly negative 
(at the 10% level), this indicates that larger and more diverse firms provide more 
accurate earnings forecasts.  This is a surprising and counterintuitive result.  Duru and 
Reeb (2002) in their study of analysts' forecasts and multinationality do not find that a 
significant relationship between forecast accuracy and firm size or operational diversity.  
FHORIZON is highly significant (p=0.0001) in this model.  This is consistent 
with predictions and prior research.  As the time between the forecast date and the end of 
the period increases, forecast accuracy decreases.   
Table 10 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 2 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as Foreign Assets/Total Assets (n=37). This model is 
significant (F value = 3.15, p=0.0157), but the variable of interest, FA/TA, is not 
(p=0.8723). With that caveat, FHORZION (p=0.0009) is significantly positively 
associated with ACC.  As in the other ACC models, this indicates that forecasts are less 
accurate as the time between the forecast announcement and the end of the forecast 
period increases. 
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TABLE 9 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Manangement Forecast Accuracy, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Accuracy - DOM = Foreign Sales/ Total Sales (n= 231) 
 
ACCi =  0 +  1DOM i + 2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i    
     
    Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept 0.525 0.2155 
     (2.21)  
Hypothesized Variable   
   
   Degree of Multinationality     (DOM - FS/TS)   0.235 0.1916 
  (1.31)  
Control Variables   
    
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)   0.040 <0.0001 
  (5.61)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)  -0.003  0.6805 
     (-0.41)  
    Firm Size(LSIZE)  -0.058  0.0829 
 (-1.74)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)  -0.035  0.0903 
     (-1.70)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)  -0.001  0.8662 
  (0.17)  
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.16    F value = 8.54 (p=0.0001) 
________________________________________________ 
 
ACCi  = the absolute value of (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = Foreign Sales / Total Sales. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
  management earnings forecast.  
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TABLE 10 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Accuracy, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Accuracy - DOM = Foreign Assets/ Total Assets (n=37) 
  
  
ACCi =  0 +  1DOM i + 2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i    
    
        Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept -0.707 0.2155 
 (-1.26)  
Hypothesized Variable       
         
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM - FA/TA)  -0.057 0.8723 
 (-0.16)  
Control Variables   
      
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)   0.049 0.0009 
      (3.67)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)  -0.003 0.9239 
 (-0.10)  
    Firm Size (LSIZE)   0.065 0.5170 
      (0.66)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)   0.030 0.6506 
      (0.46)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)  -0.003 0.8515 
 (-0.19)  
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.26    F value = 3.15  (p=0.0157) 
________________________________________________ 
 
ACCi  = The absolute value of  (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = Foreign Assets / Total Assets. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year 
period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had 
operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
  management earnings forecast.  
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Table 11 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 2 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as the number of countries in which the firm lists a 
subsidiary (n=231).   The model is significant at the .0001 level and has an adjusted R2 
of .16.  However, the variable of interest, # countries with foreign subsidiaries, is not 
(p=0.6064). The coefficient estimate for DOM is not significantly different from zero in 
this model.  FHORIZON (p=0.0001) and LSIZE (p=0.0316) have significant 
coefficients.  FHORIZON is consistent with other model specifications and indicates 
that forecasts with a greater forecast horizon are less accurate.  The sign on LSIZE is 
also consistent with the other model specifications and indicates that larger firms provide 
more accurate forecasts.   
Table 12 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 2 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as the number of geographic segments listed in the firm’s 
financial statements (n=231).  The model is significant at the .0001 level and has an 
adjusted R2 of .16.  DOM (p=0.0042) is significantly negatively associated with ACC 
indicating that firms with more geographic segments, that is, a higher degree of 
multinationality, issue more accurate forecasts.  Of the four specifications of DOM, this 
is the only one that is significant and is contrary to expectations.  This suggests that 
firms with extensive foreign operations may benefit more from increasing disclosure 
accuracy than the costs associated with aggregating earnings information across multiple 
borders.   
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TABLE 11 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Accuracy, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Accuracy - DOM = # Countries with Foreign Subsidiaries (n=231) 
 
ACCi =  0 +  1DOM i + 2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i    
    Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept 0.658 
(2.89) 
0.0043 
 
Hypothesized Variable   
       
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM –  
    #Countries with foreign subsidiaries) 
0.001 
(0.52) 
0.6064 
   
Control Variables   
   
    Forecast Horizon  (FHORIZON)    0.040 0.0001 
 (5.66)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT) -0.003 0.5718 
 (-0.57)  
    Firm Size (LSIZE) -0.073 0.0316 
 (-2.16)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV) -0.030 0.1397 
 (-1.48)  
    Analyst Following (ANL) 0.001 0.7937 
     (0.26)  
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.16    F value = 8.24  (p=0.0001) 
________________________________________________ 
 
ACCi  = The absolute value of (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = # of countries in which the firm list a foreign subsidiary. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year 
period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had 
operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month  
  preceding the management earnings forecast.  
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TABLE 12 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Accuracy, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Accuracy - DOM = Geographic Segments ( n=231) 
 
ACCi =  0 +  1DOM i + 2FHORIZONi + 3VOLATi + 4 LSIZE 
  + 5DIVi + 6ANLi + i    
 Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept 
 
0.848 
(3.67) 
0.0003 
Hypothesized Variable   
       
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM – Geographic Segments)   -0.044 0.0042 
 (-2.89)  
Control Variables   
   
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)          0.041 0.0001 
  (5.93)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)  -0.002 0.6270 
     (-0.49)  
    Firm Size (LSIZE)   -0.092 0.0059 
 (-2.78)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)  -0.016 0.4378 
 (-0.78)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)    0.005 0.3045 
      (1.03)  
 
 
 Adjusted R2 = 0.16    F value = 8.24  (p=0.0001) 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
ACCi  = The absolute value of (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = an index created by factor analysis of FS/TS, FA/TA, # of geographic 
segments and # of countries in which the firm list a subsidiary. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year 
period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had 
operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
  management earnings forecast.  
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Table 12 also indicates that control variables LSIZE (p=0.0059) and FHORIZON 
(p=0.0001) are also significantly associated with management earnings forecast 
accuracy.  As in prior model specifications, larger firms issue more accurate forecasts 
and forecasting over greater time periods provides less accurate forecasts. 
Multinationality and Management Forecast Bias 
 
Results of the test of management earnings forecast bias (BIAS) are provided 
below. BIAS is measured as the signed percentage of forecast error. Optimistic forecast 
are forecast that are greater than actual earnings. Pessimistic forecasts are forecasts that 
are less than actual earnings. Hypothesis 3 predicts that because of the greater costs and 
uncertainty of forecasting earnings for firms as they increase in degree of 
multinationality and the penalties imposed by the market for falling short of forecasts, 
multinational firms will attempt to adjust expectations downward by issuing more 
pessimistic earnings forecasts. 
Table 13 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 3 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as Foreign Sales/Total Sales (n=231). DOM (p=0.0143) is 
significantly positively associated with BIAS. This is opposite of the hypothesized 
relationship. As the foreign sales ratio increases the optimistic bias increases (forecasted 
earnings per share is more than actual earnings per share). A possible explanation for 
this finding lies in the extraordinary sample period. The 2001-2002 period was 
characterized by an unexpected economic downturn and multiple economic shocks that 
depressed actual earnings per share. The 2002 forecasts would have been less vulnerable 
to an unexpected economic downturn.  
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TABLE 13 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Bias, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Bias - DOM = Foreign Sales/ Total Sales (n=231) 
  
 
BIASi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2DOMi2 + 3FHORIZONi + 4VOLATi + 5 LSIZE 
  + 6DIVi + 7LANLi + i    
  
   Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept 
 
0.322 
(1.20) 
0.2296 
Hypothesized Variable   
       
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM - FS/TS)   0.498 0.0143 
  (2.47)  
Control Variables   
   
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)      0.036 0.0001 
  (4.49)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)  -0.001 0.8496 
     (-0.19)  
    Firm Size (LSIZE)  -0.058 0.1258 
 (-1.54)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)  -0.029 0.2301 
 (-1.20)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)   0.001 0.9247 
      (0.09)  
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.13    F value = 6.58  (p=0.0001) 
________________________________________________ 
 
BIASi  = (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = Foreign Sales / Total Sales. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year 
period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had 
operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
  management earnings forecast.  
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FHORIZON (p=0.0001) also exhibits an optimistic bias. This finding may be 
driven by the sample period. The sample includes forecasts of annual earnings for fiscal 
years ending in 2001 and 2002.  Of the 231 observations included for this regression, 
three of the observations were of forecasts issued in 1999, 18 forecasts were issued in 
2000, 103 were issued in 2001, and 107 were issued in 2002. This period was 
characterized by falling industrial output and a movement into a recession. Results may 
reflect this general economic downturn more than managerial attempt to adjust 
shareholder expectations.   
Table 14 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 3 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as Foreign Assets/Total Assets (n=37).  The model is not a 
valid model (F value=1.14, p=0.3607) and highly multicollinear as indicated by high 
variance inflation factors for LSIZE and ANL. 
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TABLE 14 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Bias, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Bias - DOM = Foreign Assets/ Total Assets (n= 37) 
 
BIASi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2DOMi2 + 3FHORIZONi + 4VOLATi + 5 LSIZE 
  + 6DIVi + 7LANLi + i    
 Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept 
 
-0.114 
(-0.16) 
0.8754 
Hypothesized Variable   
   
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM - FA/TA)  -0.642 0.4570 
 (-0.75)  
Control Variables   
   
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)   0.033 0.0639 
  (1.92)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)   0.044 0.2675 
  (1.13)  
    Firm Size  (LSIZE)  -0.053 0.6815 
 (-0.41)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)   0.082 0.3364 
  (0.98)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)   0.011 0.6219 
 (0.50)  
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.02    F value = 1.14  (p=0.3607) 
________________________________________________ 
 
BIASi  = The absolute value of (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = Foreign Assets / Total Assets. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the forecasted period divided by          
30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi                = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
 management earnings forecast.  
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Table 15 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 3 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as the number of countries in which a firm lists subsidiaries 
(n=231). This measure of DOM is significantly positively related to forecast bias 
(p=0.0153). Firms that operate in more countries issue more optimistic earnings 
forecasts. This is contrary to expectations and raises the question of why this might be 
happening. Perhaps individual country managers receive benefits from the parent 
company by providing more optimistic forecasts. 
Table 16 presents the results of tests of Hypothesis 3 when the degree of 
multinationality is specified as the number of geographic segments (n=231). DOM is not 
significant in this model (p=0.1361). The coefficient of LSIZE (p=0.0147) is negative 
and statistically significant. As firm size increases management earnings forecasts 
become increasingly pessimistic. FHORIZON (p=0.0001) again exhibits an optimistic 
bias that may be symptomatic of an economic downturn not considered at the time of the 
forecast.  
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TABLE 15 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Bias, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Bias - DOM = # Countries with Foreign Subsidiaries (n= 231) 
 
BIASi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2DOMi2 + 3FHORIZONi + 4VOLATi + 5 LSIZE 
  + 6DIVi + 7LANLi + i    
   Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
    
Intercept  0.682 0.0081 
 (2.67)  
Hypothesized Variable   
       
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM - #Countries with foreign  
    subsidiaries)  
  0.005 
 (2.44) 
0.0153 
   
Control Variables   
   
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)   0.360 0.0001 
  (4.52)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)  -0.002 0.7769 
     (-0.28)  
    Firm Size (LSIZE)   -0.102 0.0007 
 (-2.72)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)  -0.020 0.3891 
 (-0.86)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)   0.004 0.5109 
      (0.66)  
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.13    F value = 6.55  (p=0.0001) 
________________________________________________ 
 
BIASsi  = (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = # of countries in which the firm lists a foreign subsidiary. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi               = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
 management earnings forecast.  
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TABLE 16 
Cross-sectional OLS Regression Tests of the Association between Multinationality 
and Management Forecast Bias, after Controlling for Other Determinants of 
Forecast Bias - DOM = Geographic Segments (n= 231) 
 
BIASi =  0 +  1DOM i +  2DOMi2 + 3FHORIZONi + 4VOLATi + 5 LSIZE 
  + 6DIVi + 7LANLi + i    
   Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
p-value 
   
Intercept  0.687 0.0111 
 (2.56)  
Hypothesized Variable   
   
    Degree of Multinationality (DOM – Geographic Segments)   -0.023 0.1361 
 ( -1.50)  
Control Variables   
   
    Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON)     0.038 0.0001 
 ( 4.71)  
    Earnings Volatility (VOLAT)  -0.003 0.6003 
     (-0.52)  
    Firm Size (LSIZE)  -0.093 0.0147 
 (-2.46)  
    Operational Diversity (DIV)  -0.008 0.7461 
 (-0.32)  
    Analyst Following (ANL)   0.008 0.1502 
      (1.44)  
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.11    F value = 5.84  (p=0.0001) 
________________________________________________ 
 
BIASi  = (Forecasted EPS – Actual EPS) / Actual EPS.   
DOMi          = an index created by factor analysis of FS/TS, FA/TA, # of geographic segments and # 
of countries in which the firm list a subsidiary. 
FHORIZONi  = number of days between forecast date and the end of the  
               forecasted period divided by 30.  
VOLATi  = the standard deviation of the return on assets for the previous five-year period. 
LSIZE
 i        = the log of firm size.  Firm size is the log of total sales during the period. 
DIVi                = the number of primary and secondary SIC codes in which the firm had operations. 
ANLi  = the number of I/B/E/S analyst issuing forecast in the month preceding the  
management earnings forecast. 
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As in the other bias models, the coefficients for control variables LSIZE 
(p=0.0007) and FHORIZON (p=0.0001) are significant. Larger firms issue more 
pessimistic forecasts but forecast become more optimistic as they look further ahead in 
time. 
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VII. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS 
Summary  
Firms with a high degree of multinationality operate in a more complex 
environment relative to domestic corporations. These firms are subject to greater 
uncertainty regarding earnings forecasts due to the additional risk of operating in this 
more complex environment. This study uses multiple measures of multinationality to test 
three hypotheses concerning management earnings forecasts. The first hypothesis to be 
tested is that managers in firms with higher levels of multinationality will provide less 
precise earnings forecasts. The second hypothesis is that managers in firms with higher 
levels of multinationality will provide less accurate earnings forecasts. The third 
hypothesis is that managers in firms with higher levels of multinationality will provide 
more conservative (downwardly biased) earnings forecasts.  
Results of hypothesis testing are mixed. Implications are that increasing 
multinationality appears to affect management earnings forecasts, but not necessarily in 
the direction expected. Regarding the first hypothesis, two measures of multinationality 
(foreign sales / total sales and the number of geographic segments) are significantly 
negatively related to management earnings forecast precision. This suggests that as 
multinationality increases, management earnings forecast precision decreases. This was 
the expected relationship.  
Regarding the second hypothesis, contrary to expectations, forecast accuracy is 
positively related to one measure of multinationality, the number of geographic 
segments a firm discloses. This suggests there are benefits to the highly multinational 
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firm to provide more accurate forecasts, and in the case of firms with more geographic 
segments, they seem to be able to do so. It could be argued that the greater accuracy is a 
portfolio effect.  Volatility is reduced because firms with a greater degree of 
multinationality have a larger portfolio, thereby spreading risk over more business 
settings. 
Regarding the third hypothesis, contrary to the predicted relationship, two 
measures of multinationality (foreign sales / total sales and the number of countries in 
which a firm has a subsidiary) are significantly positively associated with earnings 
forecast bias. This implies that as firms increase in multinationality, management 
earnings forecasts become more optimistic. This might mean that managers of foreign 
subsidiaries make more optimistic earnings assessments that aggregate to a higher 
corporate earnings forecast. If so, then international managers may see a positive net 
benefit for making more favorable earnings forecasts. 
A fundamental argument for each of the hypotheses is that as information flows 
across multiple borders, the earnings information signal degrades. Advances in 
information systems and accumulated experience in international operations ameliorate 
this signal degradation Egolhoff (1991). Earnings data, particularly for experienced 
multinational firms, is likely to become higher quality, with less signal degradation, with 
advances in information technology. Higher quality data results in more accurate and 
more precise management earnings forecasts. This may help explain the unexpected 
findings in this study. 
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Limitations 
 
The time period during which the forecasts used in this study were made, i.e. 
1999 through 2002, may not be representative due to the variety of economic events that 
had a depressing effect on earnings. This also may help explain the unexpected findings. 
In other words, what were actually downward-biased earnings forecasts may have turned 
out to be closer to actual earnings (more accurate and less biased) due to the effect of 
unanticipated poor economic conditions. 
Future Extensions 
 
This study does not directly test information content on the date of the 
management forecast. If information asymmetry is positively related to the degree of 
multinationality then this could be reflected in trading volume on the date of the earnings 
forecasts. Future research could incorporate methodology developed by Beaver (1968) 
and Cready and Hurtt (2002), and used by Olibe (2002) as an additional test of 
information content.   
A fundamental assumption of this paper is that information asymmetry is 
positively related to the degree of multinationality. The relationship between 
multinationality and information asymmetry has apparently not been addressed in prior 
research. Of the 106 responses generated by an ABI-Inform search using “information” 
AND “asymmetry” AND “international”, and the 13 responses to a query using 
“information” AND “asymmetry” AND “multinational”, none of them addressed the 
effect of multinationality on information asymmetry. 
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A question related to information asymmetry is: “How do managers calculate the 
cost of information asymmetry?” Of the several motivations attributed to managers for 
issuing voluntary disclosures (e.g. limiting liability, signaling superior management 
skills, and adjusting investor expectations), each of these implies a cost-benefit 
consideration on the part of management. Studies investigating management earnings 
forecasts have typically used archival methods. An interesting future extension of this 
study would be to directly ask managers what costs and benefits they consider in each 
step of the forecast decision.   
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and others have developed three typologies of 
multinational operations: (1) Multidomestic -- combining low global integration with 
high responsiveness to local conditions, (2) Global -- combining high integration with 
low responsiveness), and (3) Transnational -- high in both integration and 
responsiveness.  Multinational firms differ widely in management structures and the 
resultant information flows. Gray, Salter and Radebaugh (2001, p. 37) point out that 
firms adopting a multidomestic approach do not integrate their information technology 
systems to the same extent as global firms.  Information flows from subsidiaries that 
focus on a high level of local responsiveness may find it more difficult to provide 
information for management earnings forecasts. Given these differences in IT 
integration, categorizing firms by type could extend the current study. This would 
provide evidence of the relationship of information flow and reporting by firm type.
 Primarily economically advanced countries belong to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  Another extension of interest would 
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consider voluntary disclosures of firms with significant operations in non-OECD 
countries.  It is more likely that the severity of border-crossings such as cultural, 
exchange-rate, language, technological, and legal would be more pronounced when 
operating in OECD countries.  Would cost of information processing be prohibitive or 
would firms determine that the benefits of reducing information asymmetry justify more 
precise and accurate earnings forecasts? 
The SEC implemented Regulation FD on October 23, 2000.  How this will affect 
the level of public voluntary disclosure is unclear. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) pointed out 
that the majority of earnings forecasts have been indirectly through analysts (65%) and 
that only about 10% are issued directly through press releases and other public 
communications. FD prohibits disclosure of earnings forecasts to only analysts.  Early 
evidence on the effects of FD (Heflin et al. 2003) suggests that there has been a 
substantial increase in firms’ voluntary earnings disclosures. This seems contrary to the 
Irani and Karamanou (2003) finding that analysts’ following of individual firms has 
decreased as forecast dispersion has decreased. This early evidence is somewhat 
confounded by other regulatory and economic events such as the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, and weak economic 
conditions for the period for which data is available. The extent to which 
multinationality affects management earnings forecasts may be different in this new 
environment. 
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APPENDIX 
CODING OF FIRST CALL MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS 
 The following coding scheme was used to determine the Precision dependent 
variable.  Management earnings forecasts were coded in the First Call Company Issued 
Guidance database as indicated in the First Call Code column.  The dependent variable 
was coded as indicated in the Precision Code column.  Total observations = 263 
 
First Call Description 
 
may be below 
not comfortable with 
significantly more than 
significantly less than 
meets or exceeds expectations 
may not meet earnings of between 
slightly more than 
slightly less than 
about 
between (&) 
may exceed 
below expectations 
at least 
comfortable with 
low end of  
high end of  
might be 
may not meet expectations 
less than 
more than 
miscellaneous 
okay with expectations 
above expectations 
revenues above expectations 
revenues below expectations 
sales above expectations 
sales below expectations 
at or below 
as low as 
as high as 
expects loss 
expects profit 
breakeven 
First Call Code 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
L 
M 
N 
O 
P 
Q 
R 
S 
T 
U 
V 
W 
X 
Y 
Z 
#Observations 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
49 
167 
1 
5 
4 
14 
5 
1 
0 
0 
2 
7 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
Precision Code 
 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
0 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
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